



THE CASE FOR SOUTHERN STATEHOOD

**Proceedings of an international online conference
hosted by Friends of South Yemen**

Edited by Karen Dabrowska

*Let's be brothers and each of us look after their own house.
Nehna nesalah betana wa antum taselhu baitkum.*

Message to the regime in the north from Ahmed Saeed bin Braik
President of the Self Administration of the South.



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TIMELINE

- 1500s – Yemen absorbed into Ottoman Empire. Ottomans expelled in the 1600s.
- 1839 – The British colonize Aden. When the Suez Canal opens in 1869 Aden is used as a refuelling port.
- 1849 – Ottomans make a comeback in the north.
- 1918 – Ottoman Empire comes to an end. North Yemen becomes independent and is ruled by Imam Yahya.
- 1948 – Yahya assassinated. His son Ahmad vanquishes opponents of feudal rule and becomes ruler.
- 1962 – Imam Ahmad dies. He is succeeded by his son, Sayf al-Islam al-Badr, who tries to rule, but army officers seize power and establish the Yemen Arab Republic.

South Yemen formed

- 1967 – The pro-independence insurgency prompts Britain to withdraw from the South and its former territories unite as the People's Republic of Yemen.
- 1969 – The South is renamed the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen after a communist coup. It models itself on the Soviet Union with whom it establishes close ties.
- 1970 – Republican forces are victorious in the North Yemen civil war.
- 1972 – The Arab League brokers a ceasefire after border clashes between north and south.
- 1978 – Ali Abdallah Saleh becomes president of North Yemen.
- 1979 – Fighting breaks out again between the two Yemens.
- 1986 – A bloody power struggle in the South claims thousands of lives and drives the first generation of leaders from office. Haidar Abu Bakr Al-Attas emerges as leader and tries to unify the two states.

Unity under cloud

- 1990 (May) – The two Yemens unite as the Republic of Yemen with Ali Abdallah Saleh as president. The Soviet Bloc disintegrates. Tensions between North and South continue.
- 1994 (May-July) – War of succession. The southerners are defeated by the national army. State of emergency declared by President Saleh. Vice-President Ali Salem Al-Beid and other southern officials, who declared the secession of the south dismissed.
- 1998 – The National Opposition Front (MOWJ), a group that fought with the socialists against the Northern regime, set up in London.

Al-Qaeda strikes

- 2000 (October) – US naval vessel USS Cole damaged in Al-Qaeda suicide attack in Aden. Seventeen US personnel killed.
- 2001 (February) – Violence overshadows disputed municipal polls and referendum which backs extension to presidential term and powers.
- 2002 (February) – Around 100 foreign Islamic clerics expelled in a crackdown on Al-Qaeda.
- (October) – Al-Qaeda attacks and badly damages oil supertanker MV Limburg in Gulf of Aden. One person killed and 12 injured. Yemen loses substantial port revenues.

Houthi insurgency

- 2004 (June-August) – Hundreds die as government troops battle insurgents led by Hussein Al-Houthi in the North.
 - 2005 (March-April) – Resurgence of fighting between government forces and supporters of the slain cleric Hussein Al-Houthi claims more than 200 lives.
 - 2007 (January-March) – Clashes continue between security forces and Al-Houthi rebels in the North. Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi accepts a ceasefire in the summer.
- Southern Movement (Al-Hirak Al-Janoubi) formed. Its protests calling

for the return of the South Yemen republic are brutally suppressed.

Demands for reform

- 2008 (November) – Police fire warning shots at opposition rally in Sanaa. Demonstrators demand electoral reform and fresh polls.
- 2009 (January) – Saudi and Yemeni Al-Qaeda branches merge. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) formed.

August - The Yemeni army embarks on another offensive against the Houthis in the Northern Saada province. Tens of thousands of people are displaced by the fighting.
- 2010 (September) – Thousands flee government offensive against Southerners in Shabwa province demanding independence.
- 2011 (November) – President Saleh agrees to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, after months of protests in Yemen's Arab Spring. A unity government is formed.
- 2012 (February) – Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi inaugurated as president after an election in which he is the only candidate. He is unable to counter Al-Qaeda attacks in the capital.
- 2013 (March – January 2014) – National Dialogue Conference held in Sanaa as a key part of the agreement brokered by the UN and the Gulf Co-operation Council that saw President Saleh hand over power to Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.
- 2014 – The Houthis, unhappy that Hadi stayed in power beyond the expiry of his two year mandate and the lack of implementation of the recommendations of the National Dialogue conference, take over Sanaa.

Civil war and foreign intervention starts

- 2015 – Saudi Arabia unilaterally launches an attack on Yemen under the name Operation Decisive Storm with the aim of restoring the government of Hadi and preventing the Iranian-backed Houthis from taking over the country. A civil war starts between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition militarily backed by the US, the UK and France.
- 2017 – The Southern Transitional Council (STC) which calls for the independence

of the South is established after Hadi dismisses governors of the Southern governorates.

- 2018 – Fighting breaks out between Hadi's Saudi-backed forces and the STC which is supported by the UAE. The STC seizes Aden.
- 2019 – The Riyadh Agreement, an attempt by the Saudis to solve the conflict (November) between the STC and Hadi's government, is signed.
- 2020 – The STC, unhappy with the lack of progress in implementing the Riyadh (April) Agreement, withdraws from it and declares self-rule in Aden and the areas in the South under its control.

FOREWORD: INTERNATIONAL ONLINE BRIEFING THE CASE FOR SOUTHERN STATEHOOD

In August 2019 tens of thousands of Yemenis from across the country's Southern region marched to the regional capital Aden in a million man parade celebrating the liberation of the South from the Houthis and the announcement of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) whose aim is to see the establishment of an independent Southern state.

But in media interviews some Adenis pointed out that the march was no doubt huge, but was made up of Bedouins and people from other cities across the South. Some Adenis claim that they have been largely isolated from the independence campaign despite it unravelling on their doorstep. There is also a feeling that some people just want the delivery of service and normality in the payment of their salaries.

An international online briefing organized by the Friends of South Yemen (FOSY) discussed the case for Southern statehood. What does the future hold? Seemingly oblivious to the realities on the ground, the United Nations and the international community have consistently affirmed the legitimacy of the internationally recognized government and Yemen's territorial integrity.

But Humpty Dumpty has fallen off the wall, is broken, and can never be put back together again. The cultural differences between the North and the South are incompatible and the Houthis want to rule over the entire country and turn it into their version of an Islamic state.

The South could be an independent state if the Gulf countries and other states who are intervening in the conflict give the Southerners a chance to decide their future. But what kind of future will that be: a united Southern state with a central government based in Aden, a federation of Southern states where the governorates run their own affairs, or a fragmented South with mini-statelets and local rulers vying for power?

These and other issues vital to understanding of the case for Southern statehood were discussed at the briefing which attracted more than 100 participants including nationals from as far away from the Middle East as New Zealand, the USA, the UK, France, India, and Sri Lanka, as well as North and South Yemen.

INTRODUCTION



Abdul Galil Shaif Kasim, Chairman of FOSY

Abdul Galil Shaif Kasim is a British Yemeni who has lived in the UK since childhood and graduated with a Master's degree in economics and a PhD in political science. Currently he is chief executive of the Hadfield Institute. He was Chairman of the Aden Free Zone Public Authority. He now lives in Sheffield and in the late 1990s was Chief Executive of MOWJ Media. He has been active in drawing the attention of British politicians to the situation in Yemen.

Good evening. I welcome everyone. I welcome people from Sheffield where I am now, from New Zealand, from Sri Lanka, from Washington DC, from Aden, from France and from India. Welcome to you all. It is a pleasure to have you here. This is the first conference of Friends of South Yemen (FOSY), an organization established in the UK three weeks ago.

The organization's aims are quite clear. We are interested in Yemen as a whole but we are interested in establishing a South Yemeni state because we believe very strongly that the solution to Yemen's problems and to end the conflict is to have a two-state solution, one in the North and one in the South. So our objectives are very clear. And we want the international community to recognize the state of South Yemen and we are working extremely hard to get that recognition. FOSY has started its newsletter and the first edition has gone out last week. It has set up a website. It has a meeting with the British Foreign Office on the 25th of next month and it will have several meetings with key decision makers about South Yemen and about recognizing the state of South Yemen.

Having said that, FOSY is anti-war. We believe that the war in Yemen should end with immediate effect. We believe that the humanitarian situation should be dealt with with immediate effect and we believe that no Yemeni child should die now as a result of a war that is absolutely pointless. We believe that this war has no winners except those who trade in arms and those warlords who buy and sell people's lives as a consequence of that. The best way to bring this five-year war to an end is by recognizing the state of South Yemen.

“The best way to bring this war to an end is by recognizing the state of South Yemen.”

So we as an organization are anti-war. We are anti-business traders who work on the arms sales and we want to bring the war to an end. But we believe that the best way to bring this war to an end is by recognizing the state of South Yemen.

Now the state of South Yemen was a state before 1990. It was a state from 1967 – 1990. It was an area which was called the Aden Colony and Protectorate which was occupied by the British for 129 years, and I am sure you are going to hear some brilliant speakers tonight who

are going to give you some information about South Yemen which will hopefully raise the level of understanding that you have about the Yemeni situation in general and South Yemen in particular.

We have Abdu Salam from America who heads the Southern Transitional Council Office (STC) there. Welcome Abdu Salam. And we have Eidroos Al-Alnaqeeb, Head of External Affairs of STC, and we have someone from the government and we have someone from the North. We are trying to do as much as we can to build consensus and understanding and to provide information. What people are saying to us from the outside world is that they do not know anything about South Yemen and I hope FOSY is going to change that. We are determined to change that. I chair FOSY and Karen Dabrowska, one of our speakers, is the secretary of FOSY. We have been working extremely hard for the last three weeks to get it off the ground. I think we have safely done that. Welcome to everyone and I will start with Karen Dabrowska, the secretary of FOSY.

THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE VISION OF FRIENDS OF SOUTH YEMEN



Karen Dabrowska, Secretary FOSY

Karen Dabrowska is a freelance journalist focusing on the Middle East and Islamic Affairs. She is the author of ten books including “Iraq: the Ancient sites and Iraqi Kurdistan”, “The Libyan Revolution: Diary of Qadhafi’s newsgirl in London” and “Into the Abyss: Human Rights Violations in Bahrain and the Suppression of the Popular Movement for Change.” She contributes regularly to the magazine “Middle East” and other publications dealing with the MENA region.

I would like to thank Abdul Galil Shaif for giving me the chance to say a few words. It is an honour to share a platform with so many experts on Yemen. I am your student and look forward to learning from you all.

As a journalist I recently wrote an article about the political situation in Yemen. I wanted to be sure I had explained it clearly and asked a very dear friend if all was clear. “Clear?” he said. “Yemeni politics makes me dizzy. It’s like cooking up a stew by throwing everything into the pot whether edible or not and then being extremely disoriented with a dodgy stomach or as they call it, the curse of Montezuma.”

In Yemen there are more political parties, parties that have split from other parties, NGO’s and civil society organizations than you’ve had hot dinners. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, ousted during the Arab Spring, got many things wrong but he was right when he said Yemeni politics is like dancing on the heads of snakes.

It is complicated. And here we have yet another organization: The Friends of South Yemen

(FOSY). Simplicity is the key to truth and our message is simple: we want an independent state in South Yemen and we are presenting the case for southern statehood. It's a clear, simple vision. Is it easy to achieve? Of course not. But as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe said: "Dream no small dreams, they do not have the power to move the hearts of men" – and women.



When the Southern issue is discussed there has been talk of separatism and secession. But we can no longer have this conversation as there is nothing to separate from. Yemen as a state has ceased to exist. It is over, khalas. The Houthis control 70 per cent of the North as you can see from the map published in our first newsletter and what they don't control is being fought over. They have an intimate knowledge of Yemen's mountains and canyons and in five years of bombing the 15 countries which make up the Saudi-led coalition have not been able to dislodge them despite the sophisticated weapons which the US, UK and France have

supplied. It is like the Turkish air force bombing the PKK without success. They are not going anywhere either.

The Houthis are already calling Madhi Al-Mashat, the head of their supreme political council, the President of Yemen, and are well on the way to establishing their version of an Islamic republic. Using COVID-19 as a pretext they are closing internet cafes and any other venue where people gather which is not to their liking.

Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the President of the internationally recognized government, is in exile in Saudi Arabia. He will probably go down in the Guinness Book of Records as the only president in history who makes an official visit to his own country. He flies into Aden from time to time, spends a short time there and then flies out again. But despite the realities on the ground the UN and the international community like to deal with the so-called internationally recognized government.

Five players, none of whom want the same outcome, are operating in Yemen's desert battleground: Hadi's government forces propped up by the Saudi-led coalition; the Houthis; the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council; the UAE-backed anti-Houthi and anti-Hadi forces not part of the STC; and small pockets of insurgency, namely ISIS and Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.

What about the South today? Things aren't brilliant there either. The Houthis are doing their best to make a comeback after being expelled in 2015, the forces of the Southern Transitional

Council are fighting the Saudi-led coalition and governors of provinces who do not like the STC are supporting an alternative coalition led by Turkey and Qatar.

When I was first writing this presentation I was going to say that the Southerners are all in the same boat but they are rowing in different directions, with about 25 different groups talking about an independent South. But last Saturday, July 18th, thousands of people came out in the streets of Mukalla, the provincial capital of Yemen's oil-rich Hadhramaut province, in support of the STC.

It is very significant that they raised the flag of South Yemen and not the flag of Hadhramaut. Of all the provinces in the South Hadhramaut could in fact go it alone as an independent state, but it has come out in support of the STC.

Ahmed Saeed bin Braik, President of the Self Administration of the South, had a message for the Northerners: "Let's be brothers and each of us look after their own house. As they say in Arabic: *Nehna nesalah betana wa antum tasselhu baitkum.*"

And there is something I have to add about what you read in the media. The STC is constantly referred to as "the UAE-backed STC" or "UAE-backed southern separatists" as if the STC is dependent on the UAE. Can't people accept that the Southerners have their own movement which increasing numbers support. It's the same with the Houthis. They are constantly referred to as "the Iranian-backed Houthis", but followers of Zaidi Islam have been in Yemen since the time of Prophet Mohammed - but that's another story.

A clever person learns from his mistakes. A wise person learns from the mistakes of others. The South was independent between 1967 and 1990 and made significant progress with land reform, women's rights and eliminating corruption and the negative elements of tribalism, but it wasn't all butterflies and rainbows and unity came in 1990. But things didn't go according to plan, the Southerners were marginalized, their resources were usurped and now they want to go it alone again. It is important to look at the first experience of independence and learn from what went wrong.

What about the experiences of others? When South Sudan became the world's youngest nation on July 9th 2011 after the longest war in Africa, it had a lot of support from the international community. But it has suffered ethnic violence and endured another civil war characterized by rampant human rights abuses, including various ethnic massacres.

Iraqi Kurdistan was called "the other Iraq", a place of promise of democratic development. Dutch journalist Judit Neurink wrote in a recent article: "My Kurdish friends and allies mourn a broken dream and a nation that is both politically and financially bankrupt. We feel cheated that our hopes have been smothered by the corruption of politicians who refuse real change. And sadly today, "the other Iraq" is not so different any more.

The people of the Western Sahara have been living in refugee camps in the hostile Algerian desert since 1973, determined to have their own country which was annexed by Morocco after the Spanish colonizers left. But their leaders, the Polisario Front, seem to have abandoned their noble aims, tolerate no opposition to and have alienated the people they are supposed to serve. Whither has fled the visionary gleam, where is it now the glory and dream? It bit the dust.

Make no mistake about it, South Yemen faces tremendous challenges: around half of the medical facilities have been destroyed, there is malnourishment, floods, locusts, COVID-19, corruption and the ongoing violent conflicts.

You may be sitting here in the comfort of your lovely homes thinking the problems are too great for us to solve. What can we do? I say to you, it is better to light one candle than to curse the darkness. The most important thing about the first step is to take it. And at Friends of South Yemen we have taken that step with this conference in which people from all over the world are participating. There are even a few New Zealanders from the other side of the world - as far away from the Middle East as one can be.

The saying “the pen is mightier than the sword” has to be updated. The internet is mightier than the Kalashnikov. Our website, on which there is still very much work in progress, will, in sha Allah, be an information resource about South Yemen. Our campaign for Southern statehood has begun. That you for joining us on this journey.

History is undecided. We should put aside the psychology of failure, the mentality of defeat, the feeling of impotence, and be confident that we can and will make a difference. Thank you.

WHY A SOUTHERN STATE?

Linda Mohamed Ali Hussain, Lawyer

Linda Mohamed Ali Hussain is a lawyer, political activist and journalist. She defended political detainees and activists and worked for the Court of Appeal in Sanaa as a juvenile criminal lawyer. She also worked with the UN Refugee Agency as a lawyer dealing with refugee issues and as a human rights activist for the Hood Organization and the National Authority for the Defence of Rights and Freedoms. Linda was a member of the High Committee for National Dialogue 2010-2011.

Peace be upon you ladies, gentlemen. Please allow me to briefly discuss some aspects of the southern issue to answer the question: Why do Southerners insist on returning to the former independent state of South Yemen?

With the establishment of the unified state between the southern Yemeni state and the northern Yemeni state in 1990, the Southern political leaders agreed on unity on one condition: the new state had to be based on national partnership, public freedoms, democratic governance

based on law and order, social justice, economic growth and raising living standard for the two nations. The northern party agreed to these conditions, but its approval was only a deception – there was another hidden project different from the one that was announced and signed. That is why the war started in the year of 1994. This unfortunate war was unleashed by the Sanaa regime on the South, destroying the unity agreement by military force and subsequently defeating the southern partner and bringing to an end unity between the two parties. Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Muslim Brotherhood had a hidden agenda in Yemen: to annex the south with its large land mass and wealth, its beaches and long coastline and its strategic location. These assets became the spoils of war in the hands of the political, military, religious and northern influential tribal groups. The 1994 war on the South led to the destruction of the South as a national and social entity. Its state, system, services, culture, identity, and history ceased to exist. Let me summarize the destruction that took place as follows:

1. The public health system with its free services provided to all southern citizens was destroyed.
2. The free compulsory education system was destroyed and widespread illiteracy ensued;
3. All institutional life was destroyed through the abolition of the administrative, judicial and public prosecution system which was replaced with by the traditional tribal system based on sheikhs and families.
4. More than 150 government institutions, factories, services and companies were destroyed and their assets were distributed among the northern regime's leaders and supporters.
5. The Southern fisheries were destroyed through the distribution of the fishing grounds between the Northern tribal leaders (sheikhs) and the leaders of the Northern regime. Southern public companies were leased to foreign companies that engaged in illegal and unregulated fishing in violation of environmental laws and regulations. This led to the extinction of rare fish species.
6. The seizure of more than eighty agricultural and service cooperatives and state farms by the leaders of the regime and their supporters, resulting in the unemployment of thousands of peasants and agricultural workers.

Tragic consequences for Southern citizens resulted from the actions of the Northerners and their life expectancy decreased by about ten years. Further repressive measures followed, namely:

1. The dismissal of more than 200,000 soldiers and officers from the army and security forces, including professionals such as pilots, engineers, doctors, and lawyers, who became unemployed. Many of them were nowhere near retirement age.
2. Compulsory layoffs of more than 170,000 administrative employees and skilled workers in ministries, departments, factories, companies, economic institutions, and judicial and representative agencies after their closure and the acquisition of all the South's resources and assets by the Northern regime which won the war in July 1994.
3. Replacing skilled Southern workers with Northern workers.

4. Prosecuting and abusing Southern merchants and agents and forcing them to surrender commercial enterprises to the Northern agencies, with the collusion of some influential politicians.
5. Enacting discriminatory laws and regulations against Southerners which prevented them from taking advantage of educational opportunities in Yemeni universities, foreign scholarships, and military, security, and judicial colleges. Students in the North were favoured while Southerners were denied educational opportunity.
6. Obliterating all cultural monuments, closing of theatres, cinemas, public libraries, museums, musical bands, theatre groups, and all forms of art, literature, music and other creative endeavours.
7. Ensuring the spreading of tribal culture and nurturing tribal wars and the culture of revenge in the South in conjunction with the spread of arms and ammunition. Arms trading was under the control of influential Northern arms dealers in the military and security institutions.
8. Ali Abdullah Saleh appointed his right-hand man General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, the current vice-president of the Yemeni government, to organize and facilitate the entry of terrorist groups coming from Afghanistan. Their commanders were given high military ranks in the Yemeni army, and they were allowed to establish terrorist training camps in Abyan province with the aim of blackmailing the international community. These groups were used to carry out terrorist operations against Southern cadres and against competent leaders and individuals in the South. This clearly illustrates that the Northerners did not see the South as part of their homeland but rather as a booty of war that they used for immoral and illegal purposes.

Yemeni unity, especially after the 1994 war, is based on the hegemony of one side over the other. Its intention from day one was to eliminate the Southern partner of the unification project. The Northerners now have absolute domination of power, wealth, and land in the South. Therefore any just solution to the Southern question will constitute a detraction from Northern hegemony, and for this reason the Northerners will continue to seek band aid solutions that do not go to the heart of the problem. This is evident from the Southerners' experience of 26 years of dealing with the diverse Northern political, tribal and religious elites.

These facts and a lot of other data confirm the impossibility of the Southern and Northern nations remaining in one state, even in the form of the 1990 unity that did not last even for a few months, because of the culture of rule in the North, which is based on the concept of the league of blood, and the tribal mentality. Governance in the North takes the form of a tribal state (a tribe in the form of a state), which will keep the region in a state of ongoing conflict and never ending wars which affect regional and international stability. There will be a continual threat to the ports of the South and international maritime trade across the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab Straits, and the Gulf of Aden. The dominance of political Islam represented by the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the Houthi movement over the political environment in the North makes Yemen a base for terrorist projects in the form of the Brotherhood supported

by Turkey and the Houthis supported by Iran. This makes stability and coexistence between the northern and southern peoples in one country impossible, regardless of the concessions the Southerners may agree to.

On the other hand, the majority of Northern politicians consider themselves to be representatives of the original land and consider the Southerners as a branch. They have clearly stated that the unity of 1990 and the 1994 war were for the restoration of the branch to the original land, which manifests the mentality of annexation and nothing but annexation. This confirms the impossibility of an equal partnership. To date the South has made great sacrifices in fighting terrorism, the Houthis and Turkish ambitions. Tens of thousands of martyrs have sacrificed their lives for the southern cause. Today, it is impossible to return to submission to Northern hegemony. All the Southern factions are calling for the restoration an independent state.

Southerners aspire to a democratic, decentralized country based on the principles of pluralism, order, law, institutional rule, the peaceful transfer of power, and political participation of all Southern political, regional and geographical elements.

Southerners demand a country based on peaceful coexistence with its regional neighbours and international partners, which bases its external relations on mutual respect, building and protecting common interests, protecting regional and international peace and combating terrorism. The Southerners are eager to harness the distinct geographical location of the South, its ports, territorial waters, beaches, cities and airports in the protection and promotion of world peace and integrated trade and investment between the countries of the region and the world. May God's peace and blessings be upon you all.

THE ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF SOUTH YEMEN



Shabana Mohamed Shafi Abdulkarim

Shabana Mohamed Shafi Abdulkarim, is an advocate for sustainable peace and development, a commercial artist, founder cum owner of Sheen for Trade & Marketing & Petroleum Services Yemen and Commercial Advisor at GMC international for general trading India. During the Arab Spring she worked as a Programme Manager for Food for Peace with Relief International and assisted IDP's in Aden and Lahaj. She is also a founding member of the Indo-Arab Society ladies wing in Mumbai-India.

The setting up of Friends of South Yemen is a dream come true for people like me who do not belong to a political party and do not have any political or tribal backing. It is a platform for friends of South Yemen those how have a genuine intention to participate and contribute towards the national interest without their personal agendas. It was formed for the constructive mind to engage in progressive and sustainable peace and development. Thanks to Dr Abdel

Galil Shaif Kasim for starting this initiative and giving me the opportunity to participate on this platform. It is an honour to work with a highly educated and true nationalist, fine economic and sharp politician.

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I strongly condemn this label for my nation. South Yemen
is an international asset and has all the hallmarks of becoming
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Today Yemen is described as the world's poorest country. I strongly condemn this label for my nation. South Yemen is an international asset and has all the hallmarks of becoming the Mecca for the economic world. If the international community diverts its resources from its long destructive war to peace and rebuilding south Yemen can generate revenues by itself.

Aden port revenues are expected to generate about \$75 billion per annum. The Strait of Bab El Mandib can generate billions from fisheries and from those largely unexplored oil and gas reserves estimated to be spread all over Yemen.

Hadhramaut produces the best oil called Al Masila. Shabwah governorate is rich in oil and gas resources. Lahij and Adan governorates are the richest with their gold deposits, minerals and coastline on the Arabian sea. Lahij, Abyan and Hadhramaut have the richest in agricultural soils. Yemen has the world's best coffee and honey. There are endless job opportunities in other sectors and fields like renewable solar and wind energy.

The international community, donors and friends should reconsider their funding policies. Instead of focusing on financing food baskets funds should be diverted to supporting Yemen with sovereign guarantee to ensure direct foreign investments. Yes, I repeat myself, foreign direct investments. We understand the picture and the complicated security challenges but these challenges will be overcome once the people, especially the youth, are engaged in constructive, economically uplifting jobs to secure their daily livelihood.

In the long run just providing food baskets has not helped either party. The taxpayers of the donor countries are the receivers who have been able to fend off their hunger for a few days. They need to work on sustainable economic development, they need to ensure that the help the people receive leads to independence and not long-term dependence on aid.

Billions have been spent by the international community collectively to fight this endless war at the cost of the liberated area by increasing its suffering. If only ten per cent of the money was directed to rebuilding new infrastructure, such as power plants, in Yemen's liberated areas it would not only have reduced the complexity of the ongoing conflicts but would have also helped to reduce the involvement of youth in social disputes due to a lack of feasible financial resources to survive.

UN Security Council Resolution 22/16 in April 2015 and the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference of 2013 cannot be imposed in 2020 since the reality on the ground has changed. When the Houthis attacked the southern governorates the STC became the key power on the ground while the UN-recognized government has been in Riyadh since 2015. In fact the failure of the Riyadh Agreement left the STC with no option but to declare south self-administration in March 2020. The STC will involve local and international Southerners with influence to design short-term strategies for immediate action and long-term strategies for sustainable development while they are focusing on military control on the ground.

In the end I would like to emphasise that two countries living in peace, side by side, building their own nation independently with their own resources will be far better in their contribution to the peace and stability of the region than one internationally imposed unified Yemen where unrest will prevail.

Yemen is facing its worst famine in a hundred years due to this endless war. The world has finally taken notice of the horrific distress of Yemen. I am certain proud Yemenis everywhere with the support of the international community will strive to bring it out of the shadow of sorrow and into the light of prosperity and a glorious future. I long for that day and until then I shall try in my own small way to keep people informed and interested in South Yemen. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to be heard.

Chairman: We have a senior member of the British Foreign Office with us so I hope he is listening very carefully to the issues of aid and the issue of economic development. We have always said that the issue is about investment. If we get foreign direct investment into the country we can bring business people to generate money and employ working class people to develop their country.

So I hope that message about foreign direct investment has become very clear. The need for aid is there but the need for economic and infrastructural development has been shown by the lack of electricity, the lack of a health service which is very weak particularly in Aden. The Masafi refinery built by the British six decades ago requires modernisation. At least one billion dollars are needed to regenerate that organisation. The airport also requires extension. So all these mega projects are in need of support and I am hoping that people from the Foreign Office can take your speech on board.



THE AMERICAN VIEW OF SOUTH YEMEN

Hadeel Oueis

Hadeel Oueis is an experienced radio and newspaper reporter who covered the White House and State Department news. She is a TV News Analyst (BBC Arabic, France 24, DW, Al-Hurra, Al Ghad UAE, Fox News US) and an opinion writer (Washington Institute) and founder

and member of the board of directors of North Press Agency. She has written scripts for short videos. Hadeel is also a public speaker, advocate and Arabic social media platforms coordinator for JIMENA (In Defense of the Jews of the Arab World).

Thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this beautiful conference. As a journalist and as refugee also from a very diverse and sensitive area of the Middle East, north east Syria that is composed of many diverse and different groups - Kurds, Assyrians, Syrians and Arabs - I totally understand the plight of the people of South Yemen. I will be talking about how the Americans view the issue of South Yemen and also about their approach to politics.

Generally speaking the United States and the EU prefer the status quo in countries like Yemen and the Middle East. This is the opposite of what many people in the Middle East think. They think that the Americans just want to divide countries but they don't usually look at changing the status quo and changing the borders of countries.

But in the last few years the West has realized how weak and fragmented the old status quo is in the region, especially in the Levant the area that I came from and places like Libya. Most of the countries were not made by the people. In many areas like South Yemen the West opposed the political ambitions of the people and it was just drawing lines on a map.

The US should understand that the issue of South Yemen did not start with the Arab Spring and the latest war with the Houthis

The US should understand that the issue of South Yemen did not start with the Arab Spring and the latest war with the Houthis. It started with the war in 1994 after the unity that was imposed by the political elites in South Yemen. Many of my friends from Yemen and also the people of South Yemen tell me that they asked for this unity in 1990 but even if the people asked for it, it failed to achieve its goals. It was like the unity between Egypt and Syria between 1961 and 1963 which failed, and the people and the politicians decided to end this unity.

Unity did not happen in the history of South Yemen. If you read history it did not happen because North Yemen wanted to continue imposing this unity by force because they won militarily. What we see today is that those who advocate unity want to defeat the South in a military way and to bury again the political ambitions of the people of South Yemen.

If you go back to the political vision of the US for the restoration of Yemen and South Yemen in the light of the latest policies we see that both administrations - the Democratic Administration of Obama and the Republican Administration of President Trump - tend to be less interventionist. They want to withdraw their troops and we have seen by the partial withdrawal in north-east Syria. President Trump has been talking for a long time about wanting to leave this region.

But now there is a new situation – there is Russia and there is China which are extending their influence in the region. And this is not in the interests of the United States. So the United States in the case of Yemen wants its allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to preserve their interests as they do not want to lose more of their allies to China and Russia. Maybe a Democratic administration will take a different position on the war in Yemen and the situation will change against the coalition. This is not very accurate. If you go back to the days of President Obama he stood against the congress many times in stopping the arms deals to Saudi Arabia.

In an interview I personally made with David Schnelker, the US Envoy to the Middle East, he insisted that the US fully understands the Saudi position and the reasons for the war in Yemen. They know that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has a different vision than the one in Tehran. He is looking for social, economic progressive change in his country and the last thing he's interested in is to drag his country into Iran's endless wars. But the Houthis are attacking Saudi Arabia on a regular basis in what obviously seems to be a systematic plan by Iran.

Saudi Arabia wanted this war because they want to stop instability in the region and not because they want to continue this war forever. Practically speaking the party of President Hadi and the so-called legitimate government failed continuously to bring peace. This is why we saw Saudi Arabia and the European countries wanting to preserve the status quo. They did not want to go through all these complications of giving independence to South Yemen. They accepted something which we hear about which is the Riyadh Agreement which will give partial self governance rights to the people of South Yemen represented by the STC.

The government of President Hadi continues to think in the mentality of 1994. They think they will again win militarily and defeat the one who is representing South Yemen (the STC) in a military way and they will go to Saudi Arabia and the international community and tell them we defeated everyone else, we are the status quo accept us as we are, support us in spite of all our failures. That is why they have been ignoring any agreements and the promises they give in the light of the Riyadh Agreement. We do not see the Riyadh Agreement applied. I think the government is trying to buy time to in one way or the other to oppress the people of South Yemen.

All in all from what we see the Riyadh Agreement is not being applied by the Hadi government and the STC understands that an attempt is being made to defeat it by force, which is why we see the conflict continuing in South Yemen.

What I want to say from the American side is that many people want to picture that America is against the role of the STC and the ambitions of South Yemen. This is not true at all. The accurate position of the United States is that they want to see stability in South Yemen. They want to see real counter terrorism campaigns. In the latest statements by the State Department we saw them praising the efforts of the military groups that belong to the STC. They also praised the efforts of the UAE in South Yemen.

I conclude that the United States position is that they want the status quo and now they started to understand the new status quo which is that the STC is part of it, and that is what the Hadi government desperately wants to change and go back to the old times, and they failed to do so until now.

Chairman: We have heard from three very powerful women speakers. It is very nice to see women take the lead in a conference and speak. It is a big difference from the conferences we have recently held as Yemenis.

DISCUSSION

Wajdan Majeed: (Archaeologist, founder of A Bridge for Life, a British based registered company which promotes the art and culture of the Middle East to the rest of the world). Good evening to all. I would just like to ask how are you going to reassure the West that you are not going to head towards the old times and become a communist regime again. We don't want to go from fundamentalist Islam to a communist state. It is a wonderful idea, rebuilding South Yemen as a modern state to regain its past glory. I know from my reading South Yemen used to be a very developed state with lots of factories, catering to its own needs. It is very different from the Yemen we see now which is a shadow of its previous self. I would like to know how you are going to reassure us and the rest of the world that you are not going to head that way. Thank you.

Chairman: I can reassure you that as far as FOSY is concerned we are not going to return to the old days of one party, one system, one leader, the authoritarian regime. There were good things that the Yemeni Socialist Party did. They did some good things in dealing with illiteracy, developing the infrastructure, paying salaries on time and training and educating people to go into the army and air force. They did a lot of good things. But the worst thing that they did was that they turned against each other because of their authoritarian nature. FOSY will make sure that no matter who it is – even if it is the STC – if they return to rule of one party we will bring them down. FOSY is going to work for the people of South Yemen not for any political party. We are not funded by any party and we are not going to work for any party but we will support anybody that supports the southern state and its recognition internationally. I assure you of that. The Yemeni people will never accept a system of totalitarianism ever again. Nor will they accept Islamic rule. We want to have a plural society, a multi-party state. We will make sure everyone is accountable. South Yemenis will want to contribute to their country. We are not going to kill it. We had a revolution in the 60s and the revolution ate its children. We must look outwards now, look at investment, development, wealth creation, jobs, our infrastructure, gas and oil. We have those resources in the south. It is just about state management and that is our main weakness.

Mohammed Al- Khairy: I want to thank all of you, ladies and gentlemen. Regarding the unity of Yemen, the people of the South are looking for unity with the nation as a nation and those

people [the regime in the North] do not accept that. The people in the North need to take the resources and the land of the South. This is not unity Now we have an Islamic regime in the North. How can you force the people of the South to have unity with this kind of regime?

Chairman: Thank you very much Mohammed, you made a very good point. Let me say something to make it very clear as far as FOSY is concerned. Every individual in the North and South of Yemen is important to us. We believe in human dignity for people in the North and in the South. We believe that Yemenis should have proper services and I tell you the people in the North have suffered just as much as the people in the south and FOSY will not differentiate between somebody from the North. We are talking about a regime. The elite of a military, tribal sheikhdom has benefited in the North. The people of the North have also suffered but it is up to them to rise against the Houthis and ensure that they kick them out. We wish them all the luck in the world because we what we want in FOSY is two states working hand in hand. As far as the people are concerned we want economic development, infrastructure support, we want services for all Yemenis, including those in the North. The northerners who live in the south will also be part of that state in the south and will be looked after and supported just like any other individual. I wanted to make that point. I know we have somebody from the State Department that has joined us. It is important that they understand FOSY is for all the people of Yemen. We are just talking about the structure of rule in Yemen. We cannot work under a regime that believes in sheikhdom and tribalism to rule a country. We want a democratic state. And now we have a real opportunity because the Houthis dominate 70 per cent of the Northern state and they believe that they have a God-given right to rule. We do not believe in that. We believe that it is the people who chose their leaders and the southern people will in an election chose their leaders in the future.

Dr Shahd Salha: My understanding is that that south of Yemen has a lot of professionals and they deserve to be given the chance to build their state. I understand it is very important to bring the friends who are real friends who are supporting these professionals and good people to make their country better. For the last ten years I experienced what the south of Yemen is experiencing. The people in the North do not want to change. And we just can't stick to the North because some people do not want to change. The people in the South want to move forward and change their country and they deserve this chance. My question is that we need to find the right people to be in the right position.

Leila: Basically I think your concerns about the Houthis are shared across North and South Yemen largely. Could a united Yemen not share resources under a new democratic government as opposed to this one? My other question is, is your vision for South Yemen completely secular with no implementation of traditional Islamic law?

Chairman: Thank you very much. Since these questions are directed to FOSY let me say one thing. No one more than I supported the unity of Yemen. I supported the unity of Yemen until the Houthis took over in 2015. I was very late. I actually believe now there is no option for

us except to have two states. There is no other option. There is no unity with the Houthis. It is an impossible situation. Let me tell you one thing: 99 percent of the Southerners wanted a united states of Yemen. Everybody wanted a united Yemen. In fact when Yemen united in 1990 we cried for days because we were so happy with that development. When I headed the free-zone in Aden I did as much as I could to make sure unity prevailed. It is a very noble aim. But it cannot happen with people who believe they have a God-given right to rule through their familial and tribal structures. So I think that Ali Salem Al-Beidh and the people who went into unity made a big, big mistake. They did not work out the consequences. They did not evaluate it. They did not make a study of what would be the plusses and minuses. Therefore the Southerners lost because of that 1990 lack of planning. I think if there is ever going to be unity in the future it needs to be worked out properly. The Riyadh Agreement has made provision for a federal state. The STC is part of those negotiations. But as far as FOSY is concerned we will continue to say that the only solution is a two-state solution. And in the two-state solution if the South can have a state that is independent, that is democratically elected and builds the infrastructure of the South then maybe the people of the North will revolt against the Houthis and establish a state similar to that. And then there is every opportunity to have negotiations.

Paul Palmer, former British seaman now living in New Zealand. First of all let me say that I support your efforts to establish a free southern Yemen and I just wanted to say something in a lighter vein. My first entry into the Yemen was in the 1960s, you might find that rather interesting. We were on a pair of mooring buoys off Aden. And the old man and a couple of officers had gone ashore in a rowing boat and we had no shore leave. So we waited till sunset, wrapped our clothes in plastic bags and climbed down the mooring lines and swam ashore. Sitting on the beach drying out we went looking round the town and a shore patrol put a search light on us. A voice behind the beam said: 'What are you doing?' So I said 'swimming.' A few words in Arabic, in those days I did not speak the language and then the voice said "where are you swimming?" In the water,' I replied. 'Be careful,' he said and went way.' That was my first entry into the town and then we went to the Crater.

My memories of the port are great. For merchant seamen it was a duty free port and things costs next to nothing. It was a vibrant port. On another occasion we decided to try and find the old seamen's mission which is down in the crater. We eventually got there and it was a bit of an anti-climax. We got there the day a grenade had been thrown in. The mission was closed.

The port was great. This is the first time I have done a zoom conference. Normally I would talk on a question and answer basis which makes life a lot easier. So I think I will just leave with you with the amusing thought of the two English sailors onto the beach and the shore patrol asking us what we were going to do.

Chairman: Thank you very much for that. It was very interesting and you have lightened the mood actually. Does anyone want to say something? Abdu Salam? Abdul Salam Kasim Musaid the STC office director in the United States Abdu Salam is one of my heroes in Yemen.

He was managing the office of Salem Saleh Mohammed a member of the presidential council of Yemen (1990-1994). He is also an active socialist and believes in the working class struggle. [Connection lost].

Ahmed McKander: I just want to say that the civil war has been going on for five years. We have the regional countries and the Iranians and now we have the big players like the Americans. The Houthis will take over North Yemen. They have taken 90 per cent of the land and there is only once province, Marib, which is left. At the moment they are recognized by the international community as peace brokers and therefore we should respect them. They have the respect of the people of the North. You can't deny that they are so strong and the people are supporting them. If the Houthis want a democratic state and the North Yemenis are happy with that and they have their own constitution and democratic elections they will be respected. The South Yemenis are going to be lost between the Saudi Arabians, the British and the Americans and I think the Houthis should be respected to develop their own state .

Chairman: I think Leila has responded to you. She is from the North of Yemen and she is basically saying that not all North Yemenis are happy with the Houthis. I actually agree with her. I think that the people in the North do not necessarily support the Houthis, but if they do support the Houthis, the Houthis very cleverly use this idea that they are fighting the adwan - they are fighting the enemy across the border. So let us hope that the people of the North will rise against them and have a democratic state in the North. That will be the best thing for the people in the North. I agree with you in terms of negotiations. You cannot ignore the Houthis. They are strong, they are there militarily and politically and they are very well organised, they have a command structure. To ignore that is to ignore it at our own peril politically. FOSY will not ignore that and FOSY will always push for a negotiated settlement between the STC and the Houthis. In the end it is going to be about that. It is not going to be about the legitimate government which has very little presence at all.

Ahmed Muthana: Thank you very much for this wonderful event and I congratulate you for all your hard work to establish the Friends of South Yemen. Actually we have a lot of friends but we have to do a lot of work to bring them together. I would like to add two words to your answer to the lady who asked whether South Yemen would go back to the communist regime. We are not afraid of that. We are afraid of something worse than that. We are afraid of the Turkish regime, the brother Muslims, who may come and interfere and they take over from us. But we are established in the south. It look as if their eyes are on the South now. We are not afraid of going back to communist times. Maybe Russia is also looking to the South. We advocate that in the West the United Kingdom and the USA go in and see and intervene in Yemen and bring about a solution before others bring their own solution which will be worse than Libya and Syria.

Chairman: Thank you very much, Ahmed, for making that point very clearly. It has given a new angle to the discussion. I am going to ask Alkhadher Sulaiman to speak. He has been very patient.



Alkhadher Sulaima, STC spokesman in the USA: Thank you very much for this Dr Galil and to the participants. This has been a real opportunity to hear from FOSY which has a great vision which respects not only the lost voice and the unheard voice of the Southern people which is now at least finding ears, but it respects people on both sides of the border – the North Yemenis and the South Yemenis, and this is a real opportunity. As our colleagues mentioned we do have a lot of friends but we also have a lot of work. Our goals are very clear.

We don't just want an independent South. We need a safe region. We prioritize these regional issues such as security issues, economic mutual benefits and even the fabric of the region itself.

I just wanted to clarify that the Northern people, where the Houthis have a pretty strong hold on North Yemen, are oppressed. Journalists cannot speak. Nobody can speak their mind in North Yemen. They are imposing tax, there is child marriage etc. There are many things that are suppressing the opposition voice in North Yemen so we cannot say that the Houthis are the genuine representatives there.

But it is quite different in the South. We always have this comparison, which I think is an unfair comparison in comparing the STC, the genuine representative of the southern people with the Houthis. The STC is allowing democratic life, it is allowing journalists to speak against the STC. It is also allowing other factions in the south, it is also recognizing them and trying to adhere to their cause and their aspirations.

I just wanted to clarify that our vision is to secure the region and to reinstate an independent North Yemen as well as independent South Yemen. Thank you all for this wonderful event.

Chairman: Thank you Alkhadher Sulaiman for articulating very eloquently in three minutes almost everything that we have discussed. Thank you for that. I am now going to give one minute to the speakers to sum up.

SUMMING UP FROM THE SPEAKERS

Karen Dabrowska: I would like to say very briefly that I was in Yemen in 2000 and I went to the area where the Houthis are. It was like going back to the time of the Bible. They had no electricity and no running water. When I heard that the Houthis had overthrown the government in Sanaa I was very happy. I thought now we might see some real development and those in government who had neglected large parts of Yemen deserved to be thrown off their perch. Then things went a very sad way when they started to impose a very radical form of Islam.

I would just like to make one point which is very important. Our real battle here is to get rid of the term "Southern separatists". There is nothing to separate from. The people from the

south need to be seen just as patriots, as people who want to establish a state and make it work.

Chairman: I think the point you made there was excellent. We are not separatists. The separation has been caused by the Houthi regime overturning the government and taking over the north. So separatism is a fact of life now. It is not as though the STC or anyone else had made it happen.

Shabana Mohamed Shafi Abdulkarim: I have heard that the STC has been declaring self administration for the South. We have been advising the STC to work on the economic front and secure the basic infrastructural needs of the people before pushing this. Everyone in Aden or in the southern zone is living in absolute darkness without electricity. This darkness is known for the past five years. I want to know why the STC has ignored this important pillar and is just focusing on military expansion and the Houthi rebels. What about the people? The people cannot tolerate this situation anymore. People are losing their patience. We are talking about the Houthis but the people have no electricity.

Chairman: Thank you very much, Shabana. I think you have made a very important point as well. FOSY is not the STC. The STC is its own entity. We are continuously telling the STC when they do things wrong we tell them. When there are shortages we tell them. When they make mistakes we tell them. And the biggest mistake they have made is that they have not included the highest level of cadres within South Yemen. You have referred to that and I have referred to that and I will pass on that message to the President of the STC, Aidarous Al-Zubaidi. I have a direct hotline to him and I will make sure he understands where we think there are weaknesses. And the biggest weakness is the investment side, the regeneration of the economy. That is the biggest weakness we have. Also politicians, people of high calibre need to be involved within the STC.

Linda Mohamed Ali Hussain: I want to make sure it is understood that the people of the South are not against the people of the north and they never will be. The state in the south of Yemen will be a state that will serve all the people who have been oppressed, particularly our brothers and sisters in the north.

Chairman: Your message is very clear. People are saying we might get the worse possible scenario of all. We live in the worse possible scenario now.

Hadeel Queis: I want to look at the Southern issue from the point of view of a journalist here in Washington DC. The people here do not know anything about the issue of south Yemen. In Washington the politicians and the decision makers have to be educated about the issue of South Yemen. The Secretary of State asked if the Riyadh Agreement represents the people of South Yemen, and as a journalist and a person who witnessed the situation before and now there is a huge change.

Chairman: I am now going to close this conference. We have somebody from the State Department saying they would like to meet FOSY within the next few weeks. That is excellent. People want another conference on Yemen but they want to discuss the humanitarian side. We will look at doing that. Someone was talking about getting copies of the newsletter. You will be on our mailing list. We are sending the newsletter to all the foreign embassies and the decision makers, political and economic so they understand more about South Yemen. Karen said in the beginning we have a dream. We will support anybody who will work towards the establishment of a state. Yemenis want a state. We need management. I hope that we can reverse that and manage the state for the benefit of its own people. Thank you very much to the speakers and everyone who has taken part. We will send you all a booklet of the conference and a video. I hope we can join each other again in a future conference. Thank you Abdul Salam, thank you Ahmed Mukander, Fiona Cooper, Hadeel, Karen, people from New Zealand, people from India, Alkhadher Suleiman, Mohammed Al Yaharie, Nilima from Sri Lanka. Thank you all very much for joining us. I am very pleased we had this conference. It has been a very successful one. Thank you everyone.

APPENDIX ONE

Who are the Friends of South Yemen?

Our Aim

Friends of South Yemen (FOSY) is a society whose main goal is the establishment of an independent state in South Yemen. Membership is open to all Yemenis and individuals and organisations who support this objective.

Our Vision

FOSY's Chairman Abdul Galil Shaif Kasim said: "Two countries adjoining, understanding and collaborating with each other are far better than a federal state in which wars, destruction and destitution continue. We are on a mission to step up our push for international recognition. The world's continued refusal to formally accept the South's independence threatens to plunge the whole of Yemen into the hands of the Houthi militias or extremist groups."

The Current Situation

Yemen today is an impoverished country that has turned into a patchwork of rival zones mired in endless conflicts that have so far claimed 100,000 lives, mostly civilian, and have triggered what the United Nations terms the world's worst humanitarian crisis.

To understand how such tragic circumstances have arisen, and to envisage the potential path for a way out of the present crisis it is necessary to review briefly the recent history of the country and its diverse political groups.

Historical Sketch

In 1839 the British set up a protected area around the southern port of Aden to form the

Aden Colony and Protectorate. In 1967 the British Empire withdrew from what became South Yemen after a four-year armed revolt against their rule. South Yemen (The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) became the only so-called socialist state in the Arab world in 1970.

In 1990 North and South Yemen united into one state. Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had ruled the North since 1978, became the president and Ali Salem Al-Beidh leader of the Yemeni Socialist Party from the south became the vice-president. The relationship between the two men deteriorated and protracted struggles that resulted in an all-out war in 1994 between the North and South of Yemen ensued.

The southerners felt they were side lined from power claiming that their people were left out of important military and political positions and that investments were concentrated in the capital, Sanaa, while Aden was neglected and the oil resources of the south were exploited by the regime in the North.

During the war, the southerners received no assistance from their previous patron, the Soviet Union, and the northerners emerged victorious in the three-month conflict. Inequalities were exacerbated by the dismantling of the southern army and security services and the setting up of business enterprises in favour of northern regime businessmen and by the distribution of land to the supporters of the regime in the North. Saleh exploited his Southern allies, who included the current president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, against his Southern rivals and the battle was won on military terms against the southern forces.

The National Opposition Front (MOWJ), the group that fought with the socialists against the Northern regime and lost the war of secession, was set up in London in 1998. It was financed by the Saudis who initially supported the southern cause as a way of furthering their own border dispute with the north. MOWJ was dissolved in 2001 when their funds dried up.

The pro-independence movement subsequently went underground but as the political and economic marginalisation continued, a Southern Movement (Al-Hirak Al-Janoubi) was formed in 2007. The protests it organised calling for the return of the South Yemen Republic were brutally suppressed generating a climate of fear, increased bitterness and alienation among southerners. This group has wide political popularity but lacked organisational coherence and leadership and consisted of many splinter groups.

Saleh, following his military victory, became increasingly dictatorial and complacent but managed to cling to power through a Machiavellian divide-and-rule policy. His problems were compounded by the rise to power of jihadist groups and the economic hardship suffered by the majority of Yemenis. His biggest mistake was his disregard of the southern demands for equal opportunity. By behaving like a victor and surrounding himself with yes-men he neglected the Southerners even further. As a consequence, the Southerners became more outspoken and their demands increased significantly. By 2008, they were no longer seeking a resolution to the lack of employment opportunities but became vocal and demanded an independent Southern state.

The Southern Movement was part of the 2011 Arab Spring which brought thousands of Yemenis onto the streets. Saleh who had ruled Yemen for 33 years eventually ceded power to his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in February 2012. The international community, in line with other Arab states, could no longer support his dictatorship.

The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was a transitional dialogue process held in Sanaa from March 18, 2013 to January 24, 2014. It was a key part of the agreement brokered by the UN and the Gulf Co-operation Council that saw President Ali Abdullah Saleh hand over power to Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi in November 2011 after an uprising. Hadi was subsequently sworn in for a two-year term as president in February 2012 after an election in which he stood unopposed.

The NDC made an attempt to find some solutions to Yemen's intractable problems but did not properly address the grievances of the southerners or Ansar Allah, an Iran-backed Islamic political and armed movement, that emerged from Sa'dah in north Yemen in the 1990s. It is colloquially referred to as the Houthis because its founder, Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi, who was killed by the regime of Ali Abdulla Saleh, is from the Houthi tribe and is closely connected to the Houthi spiritual leader Abdulmalek Al-Houthi. The Houthis had fought six wars against the Yemeni state.

The unpopularity of the so-called legitimate government and the general distrust of its integrity ensured its failure. After Hadi won a show election in which he was the only candidate, he stayed in power beyond the expiration of his two-year mandate triggering Houthi incursions close to the capital. In 2014 they, seized vast swathes of the country, including the capital Sanaa. Their invasion of Sanaa and their relationship with Iran was seen by the Saudis as a danger to their national security.

On 25th March 2015, Saudi Arabia unilaterally launched an attack on Yemen under the name "Operation Decisive Storm," with the announced aim of restoring the legitimate government of Hadi and preventing the Houthis and their allies from taking control of the country.

After the defeat of the Houthi invasion and their expulsion to their Northern Territory, the Southerners were confident enough to establish the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in 2017. It consisted of 26 members including the governors of five southern governorates. Their initial announcement was to restore the independence of the south. The STC had helped the Saudi-led coalition forces dislodge the Houthis from the south. The UAE intervened to provide the STC with military backing.

Relations between the STC and Hadi's government soured when Hadi dismissed Aden's governor Aidarous Al-Zubaidi and the governors of Hadramaut and Shabwa. Repeated reconciliation attempts ended in failure and in January 2018 fighting broke out between the two sides on two occasions and the STC eventually seized Aden.

Recent events

The Riyadh Agreement, an attempt by the Saudis to resolve the conflict between the STC and the legitimate government, provided for power sharing between the two. It was signed on 5th November 2019 between Hadi's government and the STC. The STC, unhappy with the lack of progress in the implementation of the agreement withdrew from it on 14th April 2020. On 26th April the STC declared self rule in Aden and the areas in the south under its control in order to strengthen its bargaining position with Hadi and the Saudis.

The present situation

The conflict has so far claimed 100,000 lives, mostly civilian, and has triggered what the United Nations terms the world's worst humanitarian crisis. An estimated 4.3 million people have fled from their homes and approximately 3.3 million remain displaced. The worst case scenario is that the country could see 93 percent of its 30 million people infected with COVID-19. Yemenis are also plagued by locusts, floods, drastic aid cuts and a collapse of the health system. The president and his government are mostly living abroad while the rest of the population endures the absence of a state and collapsing services, particularly in the South.

Conclusion

Abdul Galil Shaif Kasim concludes that Yemeni unity was a noble aim in 1990 but today the Houthis have overthrown the government and have taken over around 70 percent of North Yemen rendering unity a failed project with no hope of achieving democracy or equality. "They are now recognised as a de facto state in the north of Yemen and their ambition is a takeover of the whole country. So long as southern statehood and national boundaries are not formally recognised, the risk of renewed conflicts will prevail and Yemen will end up a pariah state run by militias where power vacuums are filled by terrorists and extremist groups."

APPENDIX TWO

Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015)

Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian Federation Abstaining

United NationsS/RES/2216 (2015)Security CouncilDistr.: General14 April 201515-05874 (E)
*1505874*Resolution 2216 (2015)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 7426th meeting, on 14 April 2015
Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), and 2204 (2015) and presidential statements of 15 February 2013, 29 August 2014, and 22 March 2015,

Noting the letter dated 24 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen, to the

United Nations, transmitting a letter from the President of Yemen, in which he informed the President of the Security Council that “he has requested from the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the League of Arab States to immediately provide support, by all necessary means and measures, including military intervention, to protect Yemen and its people from the continuing aggression by the Houthis”, and noting his letter dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar, S/2015/217, transmitting a letter from the Representatives of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,

Recalling, the resolution of Summit XXVI of the League of Arab States on the developments in Yemen, stressing inter alia the necessity to resume Yemen’s political transition process with the participation of all Yemeni parties in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and its commitment to stand by the people of Yemen,

Condemning the growing number of and scale of the attacks by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),

Expressing concern at the ability of AQAP to benefit from the deterioration of the political and security situation in Yemen, mindful that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivation, whenever, wherever and by whomsoever committed,

Reiterating its support for the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council in assisting the political transition in Yemen and commending its engagement in this regard,

Reaffirming its support for the legitimacy of the President of Yemen, Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, and reiterating its call to all parties and Member States to refrain from taking any actions that undermine the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen, and the legitimacy of the President of Yemen,

Expressing grave alarm at the significant and rapid deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Yemen, and emphasizing that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate in the absence of a political solution,

Recalling that arbitrary denial of humanitarian access and depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supply and access, may constitute a violation of international humanitarian law,

Emphasizing the need for the return to the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council

Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, including drafting a new constitution, electoral reform, the holding of a referendum on the draft constitution and timely general elections, to avoid further deterioration of the humanitarian and security situation in Yemen,

Reaffirming its full support for, and commitment to, the efforts of the United Nations and the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Yemen, in particular to the UN-brokered negotiations, and its support for the efforts of the Group of Ambassadors in Sana'a,

Alarmed at the military escalation by the Houthis in many parts of Yemen including in the Governorates of Ta'iz, Marib, AlJauf, Albayda, their advance towards Aden, and their seizure of arms, including missile systems, from Yemen's military and security institutions,

Condemning in the strongest terms the ongoing unilateral actions taken by the Houthis, and their failure to implement the demands in resolution 2201 (2015) to immediately and unconditionally withdraw their forces from government institutions, including in the capital Sana'a, normalize the security situation in the capital and other provinces, relinquish government and security institutions, and safely release all individuals under house arrest or arbitrarily detained, and reiterating its call on all non-State actors to withdraw from government institutions across Yemen and to refrain from any attempts to take over such institutions,

Deploring any attempt by the Houthis to take actions that are exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen, and noting that such actions are unacceptable,

Expressing alarm that such actions taken by the Houthis undermine the political transition process in Yemen, and jeopardize the security, stability, sovereignty and unity of Yemen,

Noting with concern the destabilizing actions taken by the former President of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, including supporting the Houthis' actions, which continue to undermine the peace, security and stability of Yemen,

Welcoming the intention of the Gulf Cooperation Council to convene a conference in Riyadh, upon the request of the President of Yemen, with the participation of all Yemeni parties to further support the political transition in Yemen, and to complement and support the UN-brokered negotiations,

Recalling its resolution 2117 (2013) and expressing grave concern at the threat to peace and security in Yemen arising from the illicit transfer, destabilising accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons,

Recognizing that the continuing deterioration of the security situation and escalation of violence in Yemen poses an increasing and serious threat to neighbouring States and

reaffirming its determination that the situation in Yemen constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Demands* that all Yemeni parties, in particular the Houthis, fully implement resolution 2201 (2015), refrain from further unilateral actions that could undermine the political transition in Yemen, and further demands that the Houthis immediately and unconditionally:
 - (a) end the use of violence;
 - (b) withdraw their forces from all areas they have seized, including the capital Sana'a
 - (c) relinquish all additional arms seized from military and security institutions, including missile systems;
 - (d) cease all actions that are exclusively within the authority of the legitimate Government of Yemen;
 - (e) refrain from any provocation or threats to neighbouring States, including through acquiring surface-surface missiles, and stockpiling weapons in any bordering territory of a neighbouring State;
 - (f) safely release Major-General Mahmoud al-Subaihi, the Minister of Defence of Yemen, all political prisoners, and all individuals under house arrest or arbitrarily detained; and
 - (g) end the recruitment and use of children and release all children from their ranks;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this resolution and resolution 2201 (2015), in particular paragraph 1 of this resolution, in 10 days from the adoption of this resolution; and in case of further non-implementation, expresses its intent to consider designating additional individuals and entities who are engaged in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen, to be subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014);
3. *Decides* that the individuals listed in the annex of this resolution shall be subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014);
4. *Reiterates* the importance of the implementation of all measures imposed by resolution 2140 (2014), as extended in resolution 2204 (2015);
5. *Calls* upon all Yemeni parties, in particular the Houthis, to abide by the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, and the relevant Security Council resolutions and to resume and accelerate inclusive United Nations-brokered negotiations, including on issues relating to governance, to continue the political transition in order to reach a consensus solution and stresses the importance of full implementation of agreements

reached and commitments made towards that goal and calls on the parties, in this regard, to agree on the conditions leading to an expeditious cessation of violence, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and relevant Security Council resolutions, including this resolution and resolution 2201 (2015);

6. *Demands* that all Yemeni parties adhere to resolving their differences through dialogue and consultation, reject acts of violence to achieve political goals, and refrain from provocation and all unilateral actions to undermine the political transition and stresses that all parties should take concrete steps to agree and implement a consensus-based political solution to Yemen's crisis in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference;
7. *Urges* all Yemeni parties to respond positively to the request of the President of Yemen to attend a conference in Riyadh, under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, to further support the political transition in Yemen, and to complement and support the UN-brokered negotiations;
8. *Calls* on all parties to comply with their obligations under international law, including applicable international humanitarian law and human rights law;
9. *Reaffirms*, consistent with international humanitarian law, the need for all parties to ensure the safety of civilians, including those receiving assistance, as well as the need to ensure the security of humanitarian personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel, and urges all parties to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as rapid, safe and unhindered access for humanitarian actors to reach people in need of humanitarian assistance, including medical assistance;
10. *Calls* on all parties to facilitate the evacuation by concerned States and international organizations of their civilians and personnel from Yemen and commends steps already taken in this regard;
11. *Reaffirms* the principle of the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises and the obligations of host Governments, including under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and under the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to take all appropriate steps to protect diplomatic and consular premises against any intrusion or damage, and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of these missions or impairment of their dignity;
12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to intensify his efforts in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and evacuation, including the establishment of humanitarian pauses, as appropriate, in coordination with the Government of Yemen, and calls on

Yemeni parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General to deliver humanitarian aid to those in need;

13. *Further* requests the Secretary-General to intensify his good offices role in order to enable a resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people, including women, for peaceful change and meaningful political, economic and social reform, as set out in the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and Implementation Mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue conference, and stresses the importance of the United Nations 'close coordination with international partners, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council, Group of Ambassadors in Sana'a, and other actors, in order to contribute to a successful transition;

Arms embargo

14. *Decides* that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to, or for the benefit of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Abdullah Yahya Al Hakim, Abd Al-Khaliq Al-Huthi, and the individuals and entities designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) (hereinafter referred to as "the Committee") pursuant to paragraph 20 (d) of this resolution, the individuals and entities listed in the annex of this resolution, and those acting on their behalf or at their direction in Yemen, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related materiel, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories;
15. *Calls* upon Member States, in particular States neighbouring Yemen, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to Yemen, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 14 of this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
16. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 14 of this resolution, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering in operable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of such items and decides further that all Member States shall cooperate

in such efforts;

17. *Requires* any Member State when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 15 of this resolution, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for supply, sale, or transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee within 30 days a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

Additional designation criteria

18. *Reaffirms* the designation criteria set out in paragraph 17 of resolution 2140 (2014), the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of the same and stresses the importance of their full implementation;
19. *Reaffirms* paragraph 18 of resolution 2140 (2014), and underscores that acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen may also include the violations of the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 14 or obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Yemen or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Yemen;

Mandate of the Sanctions Committee

20. *Decides* that the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2140 (2014) shall also undertake the following tasks:
 - (a) monitoring implementation of the measures imposed in paragraph 14 of this resolution;
 - (b) seeking from all States whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 14 above;
 - (c) examining and taking appropriate action on information regarding alleged non-compliance with the measures contained by this resolution;
 - (d) designating as may be necessary additional individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 14 above;

Mandate of the Panel of Experts

21. *Decides* that the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to paragraph 21 of resolution 2140 (2014) and renewed by resolution 2204 (2015) shall also include monitoring implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 14;

22. *Requests* the Secretary-General, having due regard for the increased mandate of the Panel of Experts, to increase the Panel to five members, and make the necessary financial and security arrangements to support the work of the Panel;
23. *Calls* upon the Panel of Experts to cooperate actively with other Panels or Groups of Experts established by the Security Council, including the 1267 Monitoring Team, as relevant to the implementation of their mandate;

Commitment to review

24. *Reaffirms* its readiness to take further measures in case of non-implementation by any Yemeni party of this resolution and resolution 2201 (2015);
25. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex

1. Abdulmalik al-Houthi

Abdul Malik al Houthi is a leader of a group that has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen. In September 2014, Houthi forces captured Sanaa and in January 2015 they attempted to unilaterally replace the legitimate government of Yemen with an illegitimate governing authority that the Houthis dominated. Al-Houthi assumed the leadership of Yemen's Houthi movement in 2004 after the death of his brother, Hussein Badredden al-Houthi. As leader of the group, al-Houthi has repeatedly threatened Yemeni authorities with further unrest if they do not respond to his demands and detained President Hadi, Prime Minister, and key cabinet members. Hadi subsequently escaped to Aden. The Houthis then launched another offensive towards Aden assisted by military units loyal to former president Saleh and his son, Ahmed Ali Saleh.

2. Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh

Ahmed Ali Saleh has engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Yemen. Ahmed Ali Saleh has been working to undermine President Hadi's authority, thwart Hadi's attempts to reform the military, and hinder Yemen's peaceful transition to democracy. Saleh played a key role in facilitating the Houthi military expansion. As of mid-February 2013, Ahmed Ali Saleh had issued thousands of new rifles to Republican Guard brigades and unidentified tribal shaykhs. The weapons were originally procured in 2010 and reserved to purchase the loyalties of the recipients for political gain at a later date. After Saleh's father, former Republic of Yemen President Ali Abdullah Saleh, stepped down as President of Yemen in 2011, Ahmed Ali Saleh retained his post as commander of Yemen's Republican Guard. A little over a year later, Saleh was dismissed

by President Hadi but he retained significant influence within the Yemeni military, even after he was removed from command. Ali Abdullah Saleh was designated by the UN Under UNSCR 2140 in November 2014.

APPENDIX THREE

The Riyadh Agreement

The two sides of this agreement,

Who met under the auspices of King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 20/8/2019 to 24/10/2019, in response to the Kingdom's call for dialogue to discuss differences, prevail with wisdom and dialogue, renounce division, stop sedition, and unite ranks:

The Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy in Yemen is committed to the three references: the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its operational mechanism, the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, and Security Council Resolution 2216 and the relevant resolutions and the decisions of the Riyadh Conference.

Confirming the role of the Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy in Yemen, led by Saudi Arabia, responding to the request of His Excellency the legitimate, elected President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi to protect Yemen and its people from the continued aggression of the Houthi militia backed by the Iranian regime, and to build on the political, military, security, relief, and developmental successes, and on top of all these restore control to most of Yemen's territory. Out of the necessity to activate state institutions, the two parties declare their full commitment to the following:

1. Activating the role of all Yemeni state authorities and institutions, in accordance with the political and economic arrangements contained in Annex I of this agreement.
2. Reorganizing the military forces under the command of the Ministry of Defence, in accordance with the military arrangements contained in Annex II of this agreement.
3. Reorganizing the security forces under the command of the Ministry of Interior, in accordance with the security arrangements contained in Annex III of this agreement.
4. Upholding the full citizenship rights of all Yemeni people, to reject regional and sectarian discrimination, and to reject division.
5. Stopping abusive media campaigns of all kinds between the parties.
6. Uniting efforts, under the leadership of the Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy, to restore

security and stability in Yemen and confront terrorist organizations.

7. Forming a committee under the supervision of the Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy in Yemen, led by Saudi Arabia, to follow up, implement, and achieve the provisions of this agreement and its annexes.
8. The participation of the Southern Transitional Council in the government delegation to consultations on the final political solution to end the coup of the Houthi terrorist militia backed by the Iranian regime.
9. Upon the signing of this agreement, His Excellency the President of Yemen will issue his directives to all state agencies to implement the agreement and its provisions.

Annex I: Political and Economic Arrangements

1. The formation of a government of political competence seating no more than (24) ministers whose members are appointed by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister and the political components, provided that the ministerial portfolios shall be equal between the southern and northern provinces, within thirty days of the signing of this agreement. Those selected for the ministerial portfolio should be recognized for their integrity, competence, and experience, and did not engage in any hostilities or incitement during the events in Aden, Abyan, and Shabwa. Members of the government will be sworn in by the President the day after its formation in Aden.
2. His Excellency the Yemeni President shall appoint, on the basis of the criteria of competence and integrity, and in consultation, a governor and director of security of Aden governorate within fifteen days of the signing of this agreement, and the appointment of governors of Abyan and Al-Dhale'a within thirty days of the signing of this agreement in order to improve the efficiency and quality of work.
3. The Prime Minister of the current government will begin his work in the interim capital Aden within 7 days of the signing of this agreement to activate all state institutions in the various liberated provinces to serve Yemeni citizens, and work on the payment of salaries and financial benefits to employees of all military sectors. The state's security and civil affairs shall be in the provisional capital Aden and all liberated governorates.
4. His Excellency the Yemeni President shall appoint, based on the criteria of competence and integrity and in consultation, governors and security directors in the rest of the southern governorates, within 60 days of the signing of this agreement.
5. Management of state resources, ensuring the collection and deposit of all state revenues, including oil, tax, and customs revenues in the Central Bank of Aden, spending under the

budget adopted in accordance with Yemeni law, and submitting a transparent periodic report on its revenues and expenses to parliament for evaluation and monitoring, and the contribution of regional and international experts and specialists to provide the necessary advice.

6. Activating the Central Authority for Oversight and Accountability and strengthening it with honest and professional figures and reconstituted the National Anti-Corruption Authority and activating its oversight role.
7. Restructuring and activating the Supreme Economic Council and strengthening it with competent, experienced, impartial and independent individuals, and associated with the Prime Minister to support fiscal and monetary policies and fight corruption.

Annex II: Military Arrangements

1. The return of all forces – which moved from their main positions and camps towards Aden, Abyan, and Shabwa governorates since the beginning of August 2019 – to their former positions with all their personnel and weapons, and to be replaced by security forces belonging to the local authority in each governorate within 15 days of the signing of this agreement.
2. Assembling and transporting medium and heavy weapons of various types from all military and security forces in Aden, within fifteen days from the date of the signing of this agreement, to camps within Aden identified and supervised by the leadership of the Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy, and removal of these weapons is allowed only under approved plans and under the direct supervision from the Leadership of the Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy in Yemen. These weapons include in particular tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, Katyusha rockets, heavy mortars, thermal rockets, and heavy and medium-caliber armed vehicles.
3. Transfer of all government military forces and Transitional Council military formations in Aden governorate to camps outside Aden governorate, determined by the leadership of the Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy in Yemen, within thirty days of the signing of this agreement, and directing them under approved plans and under the direct supervision of the leadership of the Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy in Yemen, excluding the First Presidential Protection Brigade, which is tasked with protecting the Presidential Palace and their surroundings and securing the movements of His Excellency the President, and providing security protection to the leaders of the Southern Transitional Council in Aden under the supervision of the leadership of the Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy in Yemen.
4. Unifying the military forces contained in paragraph (3), numbering them and including them in the Ministry of Defense and issuing the necessary decisions, and distributing

them in accordance with the plans adopted under the direct supervision of the leadership of the Coalition for Supporting Legitimacy in Yemen, within 60 days of the signing of this agreement.

5. Reorganizing the military forces in the governorates (Abyan and Lahj) under the command of the Ministry of Defense, with the same measures that were applied in Aden province, within 60 days of the signing of this agreement.
6. Reorganizing the military forces in the rest of the southern governorates under the command of the Ministry of Defense, with the same measures that were applied in Aden province, within 90 days of the signing of this agreement.

Annex III: Security Arrangements

1. Police forces in Aden governorate are responsible for securing the governorate while reorganizing government forces and the formations of the Transitional Council according to need and the security plan, and for selecting their elements according to competence and professionalism and work on their training, and to be linked to the governorate security chief and numbered as security forces of the Ministry of Interior, within 30 days of the signing of this agreement.
2. Reorganization of special forces and counter-terrorism forces in Aden governorate, selection of new elements of the Legitimacy forces and the formations of the Transitional Council, and work to train them, appoint a commander, and number them as security forces under the Ministry of Interior, taking into account the confidentiality of terrorism combat elements, to carry out counter-terrorism operations and to participate in securing Aden, within 30 days of the signing of this agreement.
3. Reorganization of the forces responsible for protecting installations in a unified force under the name “Installations Protection Force” within 30 days of the signing of this agreement, as follows:
 - The members of the Force are selected on the basis of the competence of the current military forces protecting installations, from the legitimacy forces, or formations of the Transitional Council.
 - This force is to fully protect the civilian installations, the government headquarters, the central bank, the ports of Aden, Aden airport, the refinery and the headquarters of the branches of ministries and state institutions in Aden.
 - This force is linked to the Ministry of the Interior and is designated as its security force.
4. The Installation Protection Force, within 90 days of the agreement, will protect the remaining civilian and vital installations in the rest of the liberated governorates, the ports of Mukalla, Al-Dhabba, Al-Mocha and Balhaf facility.

5. Unifying and redistributing the security forces, numbering them, including them under the Ministry of Interior, and issuing the necessary decisions, within 60 days of the signing of the agreement.
6. The reorganization of security forces in Abyan and Lahj governorates under the leadership of the Ministry of Interior with the same measures that were applied in Aden province, within 60 days of the date of the agreement.
7. Reorganization of security forces in the rest of the southern governorates which are not on the lists of the Ministry of Interior under the leadership of the Ministry of Interior, with the same measures that were applied in Aden province, within 90 days of the signing of the agreement.

APPEAL FROM THE FRIENDS OF SOUTH YEMEN

History is undecided. We should put aside the psychology of failure, the mentality of defeat, the feeling of impotence and be confident that we can and will make a difference.



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