Al-Mahrah, sometimes referred to as the wild east, is the second-largest but least populated Yemeni governorate, with barely 120,000 inhabitants. It is also the most remote one, as a result of which its population has historically maintained stronger relationships with Abu Dhabi, Muscat, and Riyadh than with Sana’a.
Al-Mahrah has historically been inhabited by the Mahri people, a South Arabian tribe with its own language. The Mahri linguistically, culturally, and genetically have more in common with the Socotri people of Socotra and the Dhofari people of Oman’s neighboring Dhofar region. The Mahri people are by some, considered to be the descendants of the ancient Ad Kingdom, credited as being the first people to domesticate the camel.
In the 620s AD Mehri bin Abyad, the then leader of the Mahrah went to Medina to meet the Prophet Mohammed. Following his return, the Mahri began practicing Islam but quickly returned to their paganistic ways after the death of the prophet in 632. Eventually, the Mahri once again embraced Islam. Fast-forwarding a bit, Al-Mahrah existed as a semi-autonomous Mahrah Sultanate from 1432 to 1967 and included the present Al-Mahrah Governorate, as well as the island of Socotra. In 1967 Al-Mahrah would go on to become a part of South Yemen.
Al-Mahrah’s population is composed mainly of tribespeople and low-status farming and fishing communities of various origins. Those living in the eastern part of the governorate have close ties to Oman’s Dhofar governorate. Its culture, including its Himyari language, was significantly different from that of the rest of the country, but it has largely become ‘Yemenised’ in the past five decades.
The Saudi-led coalition has accused the Houthis of smuggling weapons through Al-Mahrah, which has long served as a hub for trafficking. More broadly, the coalition claims that its intervention in Yemen focuses on preventing Iran from smuggling weapons to the Houthis via Oman – despite the fact that most of this activity centres on direct sea routes to the eastern regions of Yemen and lacks any connection to Oman. This justification for Saudi and Emirati intervention in Al-Mahrah’s affairs has drawn the relatively peaceful governorate into the international discourse on Yemen’s war.
The current situation in Al-Mahrah is shaped by the same factors that prevail elsewhere in the south, including political and tribal rivalries, as well as foreign powers’ ambitions to capitalise on the fragmentation of the Yemeni state. Since the beginning of the war, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have vied for control of Al-Mahrah. In 2018 Saudi Arabia took the lead in the governorate, where it is widely believed to be planning to build an oil pipeline that would free it from dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. The Saudi authorities have taken over the port of Nishtun, whose capacity they are increasing.
The war has also increased the importance of trade routes that cross Yemen’s land borders. Indeed, Shehen border post has developed into a flourishing town and an important link to the country. Customs and other duties collected there generate a significant income for the governorate. However, in August 2018, the Saudi authorities compelled the Mahri administration to raise customs duties by 70 percent and to reject customs documents issued in the Oman Free Trade Zone – measures intended to undermine trade between Oman and the governorate.
Oman views these moves as having brought the war closer to its border. The country wishes to maintain its strong ties to, and its influence in, Al-Mahrah due to the close tribal relations between Dhofaris and Mahris. Muscat is also concerned that the Saudi presence there may foment extremism on Oman’s border, particularly after the recent opening of a Salafist school in Sayhut, in the west of the governorate. Competition between states neighbouring Yemen and the funding they provide to their respective supporters has created tension among Mahris. Islah has a presence in Al-Mahrah and, as in other governorates, this is strongest among low-status social groups.
Saudi Arabia successfully pressured the Yemeni authorities to appoint its ally, strongman Rajeh Bakrit, as governor of Al-Mahrah in November 2017. So far, he has tried to accommodate all powers within the governorate and the wider region. He replaced Mohammed bin Kuddoh, who was closer to both Oman and the UAE (despite the rivalry between these two states). The most popular political entity in the governorate is the General Council of the Sons of Al-Mahrah and Soqotra, headed by Sultan Abdullah bin Isa Al Afrar – a member of the family that ruled the Sultanate of Mahrah and Qishn until its abolition in 1967. Since its inception in 2012, the council’s main goal has been to create a federal region within the borders of the former sultanate. The council seeks to restore the sultanate’s linguistic, cultural, social, geographical, and historical independence and homogeneity – as well as to increase its own role in political decision-making in Al-Mahrah, after its historical exclusion and political marginalisation.
In October 2019, as tensions between the STC and the IRG grew, the Southern Salvation Council formed by drawing together the anti-coalition group the Youth of Al-Mahrah, led by Sheikh Ali Salem al-Hurayzi, and elements of the southern Hirak, including Ba’um. Hurayzi has strong tribal connections in both the north and the south, while Ba’um has been a leader of the independence movement since it first emerged. Although Ba’um later withdrew from the Southern Salvation Council, the organisation remains popular as it opposes Saudi Arabia’s policy of controlling the governorate indirectly through development and relief projects, as well as its military presence. The council also opposes Emirati involvement in the governorate and, unlike most southern movements, supports Yemeni unity. While the Southern Salvation Council and the General Council fundamentally disagree about the future of Al-Mahrah, they are united in their opposition to foreign intervention. Like Hadhramaut, Al-Mahrah has been relatively successful in avoiding violent conflict due to the formation of tribal and technocratic alliances based on notions of a shared apolitical identity.
Source: War and pieces: political divides in southern Yemen by Helen Lackner.