Friends of South Yemen
There are several different theories as to the origin of the name ‘Hadhramaut’. The oft-visited tomb of the Prophet Hud lies within the wadi, and the similarity between his name and the beginning of Hadhramaut has led some to speculate that the region’s name and the beginning of Hadhramaut has led some to speculate that the region’s name is derived from its prophet. Another line of thought holds that the word ‘Hadhramaut’ – which, both the name and the civilization of Hadhramaut, extend well into antiquity. Hadhramaut is referred literally means ‘death comes’ originates from the last worlds that the Prophet Hud spoke. On the other side of the spectrum there are tales of a tribal chief name Amr who fought so fiercely in battles that it was said that ‘death comes’ with him.
In any event, both the name and the civilization of Hadhramaut extend well into antiquity. Hadhramaut is referred to in the 10th Chapter of Genesis as Hazamaveth, one of the 13 listed sons of Joktan, correlating to the great Yemeni forefather Qahtan. The area has been inhabited since the Stone Age, and the ancient capital of the region, Shabwa, likely began as a settlement in the 2nd millennium BC. Sometime around the beginning of the 1st millennium BC, the tribes of the region formed the Hadhramaut Kingdom, a power which would exist for nearly 1,300 years.
After the death of Prophet Mohammad, many regions that were once loyal to Islam began to fall from the fold. This led to a series of battled across the Arabian Peninsula which were known as the Wars of Apostasy.
In Hadhramaut trouble was brewing as well, but it as not quite as simple as merely a revolt against paying Islamic taxes, as was the case in other areas of the peninsula. Disagreements between the local tribes in the area has spiralled out of control into all-out war. Local historians say that members of the Banu Mu’awiya tribe had become involved in a dispute with Ziyad bin Labid, the Medinan-appointed governor, and with the Hadrami tribes of the region, concerning the methods of collection and distribution for the Islamic almd taxes and concerning a scandal regarding Ziyad’s refusal to return a Banu Mu’awiya she camel.
With the support of the local Hadrami tribes, Ziyad had initial success against the Banu Mu’awiya, klling m ny of the tribe’s leaders in a surprise attack. But the attack did not succeed in putting down the revolt. Rising to defend the honour of his fallen leaders, Abu Muhammad al-Ash’ath bin Qays led his forces to mount a counter-attack. Known for his strategic planning and unfamiliarity with a hairbrush (his nom de guerre, ‘al-Ash’ath’ means the one with crazy hair) al-Ash’ath defeated Ziyad’s army near Tarim.
When al-Ash’ath learned that the Medinan General al-Muhajir was marching towards Hadhramaut with a large Muslim army, he and his troops walled up in the for of Nudjayr and waited for the army to approach. Al-Muhajir besieged the fort with great success.
Sensing that his defeat was nigh, al-Ash’ath secretly agreed with al-Muhajir that he would open the doors to the fort in return for the safe passage of the nine-to-be-named family members. With the gates to the stronghold opened, the Muslim army entered and dispatched over 1,000 members of the rebel army. Al-Ash’ath almost met with an untimely end as well as he clumsily had forgotten to write his own name down on the list of nine to receive amnesty. In the end, the general decided to spare his life and sent him to Medina as a prisoner.
Around the year AD 685 a group of individuals settled in Hadhramaut from the Kharajite branch of Islam, the sect that formed to oppose Ali and M’awiya afer the arbitration at Siffin regarding the rule of the Muslim community after the death of Prophet Muhammad. The Ibadhis, a moderate branch of the group lived in Hadhramaut in the 7th century and were able to defeat the unpopular governor of Sanaa. But they were vanquished when they rose their heads above the parapet and tried to expand their influence to Mecca. Writing in the 14th century ibn Khaldun wrote that the inhabitants of Hadhramaut abhor Ali for having consented to submit his rights to human judgement - a reference to the Ibadhi faith. The sect no longer survives in Hadhramaut today but the faith continues to exist to the east in Oman.
Hadhramaut was also influenced by the Hadhrami Sayyids. In AD 932 a man by the name of Ahmed bin Isa (appropriately known as the migrant) migrated from Basra, Iraq to Wadi Hadhramaut. He settled in the area and became the ancestor of all the Hadhrami Sayyids – the descendants of Prophet Muhammad in the region. (Ahmed himself was nine generations removed from Muhammad). His descendants moved eastward along Wadi Hadhramaut, settling in various areas along the way.
Nearly 200 years later Ali bin Alawi the endower, the great-great-great-grandson of the migrant settled in Tarim which became a permanent base for the Sayyids. More importantly, the Sayyids finally became viewed as a permanent fixture of Hadhramaut rather than as a band of migrants. They supported the area economically and easily befriended and assimilated into the native Hadhrami society.
In the 13th century, the Hadhrami Sayyids turned to Sufism. Muhammad bin Ali who was the grandson of Ali the Endower and who is known as the Great Teacher met with a Sufi theologian who had been sent by the great north African Sufi saint Abu Madyna Shu’ayb. Together they helped to spread the faith.
Source: Yemen by Daniel McLaughlin, Bradt Travel Guides.
In more recent times The Qu’aiti sultans ruled the vast majority of Hadramaut, under a loose British protectorate, the Aden Protectorate, from 1882 to 1967, when the Hadhramaut was annexed by South Yemen. The Qu’aiti dynasty was founded by ’Umar bin Awadh al-Qu’aiti, a Yafa’i tribesman whose wealth and influence as hereditary Jemadar of the Nizam of Hyderabad’s armed forces enabled him to establish the Qu’aiti dynasty in the latter half of the 19th century, winning British recognition of his paramount status in the region, in 1882. The British Government and the traditional and scholarly sultan Ali bin Salah signed a treaty in 1937 appointing the British government as "advisors" in Hadhramaut. The British exiled him to Aden in 1945, but the Protectorate lasted until 1967.
In 1967, the former British Colony of Aden and the former Aden Protectorate including Hadramaut became an independent Communist state, the People’s Republic of South Yemen, later the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. South Yemen was united with North Yemen in 1990 as the Republic of Yemen. Even under a central government Hadhramauis maintained a strong local identity with the governorate and established powerful local government institutions.
The capital and largest city of Hadhramaut is the port Mukalla. Ash Shihr is another important port. One of the more historically important cities in the region is Tarim. An important locus of Islamic learning, it is estimated to contain the highest concentration of descendants of the Prophet Muhammad anywhere in the world.
Historically, Hadhramaut was known for being a major producer of frankincense, which was mainly exported to Mumbai in the early 20th century. The region has also produced senna and coconut. Currently, Hadhramout produces approximately oil which was discovered in 1993. The Yemeni government is keen to develop its oil fields to increase oil production in order to increase national wealth in response to the requirements of economic and social development in the country. Oil contributes 30-40% of the nation’s GDP, over 70% of total state revenues, and more than 90% of the value of the country’s exports.
Until the establishment of the PDRY, Hadhramaut was divided between the Kathiri and Qu’ayti sultanates. It is Yemen’s largest governorate and has a diverse population. The sada have played a major economic and political role there – in contrast to other governorates. Tribal groups in Hadhramaut are based mainly on the jol and coastal plains. Although the sada and tribal groups own the governorate’s agricultural land, members of low-status groups do most of the farming there. People in the governorate have long-standing ties to Saudi Arabia and south-east Asia thanks to migration in the last century and the nineteenth century respectively. Some members of the diaspora have become very wealthy and, since unification, invested in the governorate. The governorate’s oil income has in the past not directly benefited Hadhramis, causing some resentment.
Hadhramaut effectively has three different sub-areas. The first of these is the coastal region centring on the capital of Mukalla, which al-Qaeda took over in 2015 and the government recaptured a year later. (While the UAE claimed this as a major victory for its fighters and the Hadhrami Elite Force, the transfer of control was a negotiated event in which al-Qaeda fighters withdrew with the weapons and other loot they had acquired.) The second sub-area is the remote, sparsely populated and inaccessible jol across which jihadist groups are dispersed – and from which they launch occasional attacks.
The third sub-area is the agriculturally wealthy wadi (dry water course), whose capital is Seiyun. Politically, this area is currently aligned with the IRG. There are few pro-independence forces in the wadi, where Islah is powerful and controls a considerable number of seats in the Yemeni Parliament – largely thanks to support among the low-status agricultural community and the work of its charitable institutions. Some of its one-time supporters have moved on to a more extreme form of Islamism; in recent years, al-Qaeda and ISIS have carried out assassinations in Qatn, Shibam, and Seiyun, usually targeting Yemen Army and coalition figures. Most of these attacks occur in broad daylight, thereby brazenly undermining the authority of the state. In northern Hadhramaut, the IRG’s military forces – including those in Al Abr Military Base, Al Khasha, and Bin Ayfan (which is 40km west of Al Qatn) – are under the command of Vice-President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar.
The presence of Islah and jihadists in remote areas has generated some speculation among locals and some terrorism experts that they may cooperate with one another. The most influential Islahi figure in the wadi is Salah Batais, who currently resides in Turkey along with many Islahi figures. Other powerful leaders there include Sheikh Abdullah Saleh al-Kathiri – a member of the former ruling family, and currently an adviser to Hadi – and Sheikh Awadh bin Salem bin Munif al-Jabri, a tribal leader widely respected in both the wadi and the jol. All of them oppose the independence movement – although they are likely more committed to Hadhramaut than to the Yemeni state as a whole.
There is a real possibility of increased tension between supporters of Sufi traditions and recently established Salafist movements, Islah, and jihadist groups. Sufis have a particularly important presence in Tarim – home to Dar al-Mustafa, a famous Sufi establishment that attracts many foreign students. This emergence of extremist Salafist groups in the area poses an existential threat to Tarim’s diverse social fabric, rich cultural identity, and prominent families. It has the potential to exacerbate sectarianism in Hadhramaut and further erode religious tolerance throughout the country. Meanwhile, supporters of former sultanates are one of several groups that have made attempts to restore their influence in the governorate, reviving a range of old rivalries.
In coastal areas, where the state had been largely absent since 2011, the Hadhrami Elite Force was welcomed by locals and the governor as providers of security and stability. There were obvious incentives for locals to join this force, as it pays higher salaries than the Yemen Army. Comprising an estimated 11,000 fighters, the force provides the STC with a presence in coastal Hadhramaut. The area is currently under the authority of Governor Faraj Suleiman al-Bahsani, who was appointed in 2017. Although he was recommended by the Saudis, Bahsani has a reputation that has encouraged locals to accept Hadi’s authority. Bahsani and his deputy are primarily loyal to Hadhramaut rather than the IRG or the UAE-backed STC, but he has maintained good diplomatic ties with both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.
Since 2017, Hadhrami politicians in Yemen and the diaspora have planned a Hadhramaut Inclusive Conference on the future of their governorate, a gesture of unity that has brought influential figures of various backgrounds together. They held a series of preparatory meetings, but the conference itself was prematurely abandoned shortly after the first day’s meeting. Nonetheless, the organisation has grown in strength, actively promoting concerns specific to Hadhramaut under the leadership of Amr bin Habrish, chief sheikh of the militarily important Hamum tribe, and, since 2019, deputy governor. The conference’s secretary-general is Tarek al-Akrabi, who officially represents it in Riyadh. Ahmed Ba Mu’alim, a representative of Beedh’s separatist faction and a close ally of the STC, has joined the conference while maintaining good relationships with other Hadhrami figures. The positive nature of this relationship has generated speculation that the Saudis and the Emiratis may now support the conference’s efforts to maintain peace in the governorate. The organisation remains engaged with public life in Hadhramaut, funding economic and environmental projects such as initiatives for children. It also has offices in both the wadi and on the coast. The conference has gained popular support due to its ability to unite a diverse set of Hadhrami figures within the governorate and beyond.
Although there are differences between the Hadhramaut Inclusive Conference and Bahsani over the future of the governorate, he has also strengthened his ties with Hadhramis by advocating for popular initiatives. For instance, he has called for Hadhramaut to retain 20 percent of its oil revenues, threatening to halt oil production if the government rejects this demand. In this way, both the governor and the conference are attempting to protect Hadhrami interests while maintaining good relations with the leaders of the Saudi-led coalition. In Mukalla, the STC and Bahsani endeavour to remain on good terms with each other, as the city hosts the largest and most active STC presence in the governorate. Notable STC figures in Hadhramaut include General Ahmed bin Breik – a former governor of Hadhramaut and a former member of the General People’s Congress (but no relation to STC Vice-President Hani bin Breik) – and Aqil al-Attas, a member of the STC’s presidential council and a former Islah supporter.
Many influential figures in Hadhramaut seek to remain neutral in the current war as they advocate for local Hadhrami concerns. However, for Hadhramis, neutrality can be dangerous. Hakam Saleh bin Ali Thabet al-Nahdi, a former supporter of the General People’s Congress, may have suffered a personal cost for his neutrality in 2018, when his son was killed. Many Hadhramis feel that the killing was meant to warn neutral leaders to pick a side.
Source: War and pieces: political divides in southern Yemen by Helen Lackner.
The Hadhramis of Yemen have migrated for centuries in large numbers, establishing a diaspora that extends around the Indian Ocean, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States. This migration has deeply affected the host countries as well as Hadhramaut itself. Yet the region has not been able to use its population size, capabilities or resources to wield significant political influence in successive Yemeni regimes. This book examines the people of the Hadhrami diaspora, who travelled as religious scholars, traders, labourers and soldiers, to understand their enduring influence and identity. In doing so, the book explores key aspects of their history, including the impact of Yemeni nationalist movements, the significance of land reforms, the importance of social and tribal origins and how the Hadhrami resisted European domination as a Muslim community. Although a distinctive part of geographical Yemen, Hadhramaut was not regarded as a Yemeni political entity until the twentieth century. This research asks if the recent turmoil in Yemen following the Arab Spring, the growth of Al-Qa’ida and ISIS, and war involving a coalition led by Saudi Arabia, will produce even greater instability in the region or perhaps lead to a united Yemen, a restored South Yemen or even to Hadhramaut as an independent state.
Describing Hadhramaut as one of the most underdeveloped regions of the world and greatly in need of help, the trust promotes philanthropic, educational and medical links between the people of Hadhramaut and overseas, bringing their needs to the attention of those who may be in the best position to help. It aims to raise living standards, individually and collectively, relieving poverty.
Web site: http://hadhramaut.co.uk/